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Abstract 
Purpose: 
Telecommunications comprises a vital component of information infrastructures and 
services, with an historically strong public interest dimension. For the best part of 30 
years, the telecommunications sector in Europe has been the subject of a radical 
reorganisation in structural and operational terms along the lines of neo-liberalism. 
This article analyses the significance of the neo-liberal project in telecommunications 
in respect of the related dimensions of ideology and practice. 
 
Approach: 
Public policy critique of the manifestation of neo-liberalism in the 
telecommunications sector in the European Union, employing desk based research on 
relevant primary and secondary source documentation. 
 
Findings: 
The article finds that proponents of neo-liberalism have been able to secure the broad 
acceptance of neo-liberalism as a ‘view of the world’ for telecommunications. It 
shows that in practice, however, the neo-liberal model in telecommunications 
provides evidence of a less than efficacious adoption process in three respects: neo-
liberalism requires an elaborately managed system the regulatory burden of which has 
been under-emphasised; the normative success of neo-liberalism has masked how 
difficult it has actually proven to be to create competition; the preoccupation with 
markets and competition has resulted in de-emphasis of public interest issues in 
telecommunications. 
 
 
Originality: 
This article contributes up to date knowledge of the nature and effects of neo-
liberalism in the European telecommunication sector. It provides a challenge and 
counterweight to the ‘received wisdom’ that neo-liberalism has been an 
overwhelmingly successful approach to the re-ordering of European 
telecommunications. 
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1. Introduction: The Place of Telecommunications in the Information 
Infrastructure 
 
In a time of increasingly networked information facilities and services, 
telecommunications play an important enabling role in the functioning of the 
information environment. Historically a sector of distinct economic importance, it is 
estimated to have generated across the European Union as much as Euro 289 billion 
in 2006 (European Commission 2007, p.21). Telecommunications has also long been 
held as socially significant, having been considered in Europe and beyond for most of 
the 20th century to possess important public interest dimensions. Here, the provision 
of universal infrastructure and service was held as a goal of public policy. In this way, 
telecommunications played its part in the broader underpinning public interest 
aspirations and practices that characterised the development of related parts of 
information and communications, notably the mass communication broadcasting, 
postal services and public library systems. As a consequence, the state historically has 
played a prominent role in the sector’s functioning.  
However, over the last 30 years or so, telecommunications has undergone 
transformational change in organisational terms which has made it of considerable 
interest to scholars of information policy and regulation, in particular. This article 
focuses on the reasons for, and the consequences of, this fundamental set of 
developments through characterising and critiquing the influence which neo-
liberalism has exerted on the sector’s development. The article explores the changing 
nature of the relationship between states, markets and the public interest in 
telecommunications through a critique of the emergence of neo-liberalism as the 
predominant way of envisioning the delivery of this key part of the information 
infrastructure and its services in Europe. In so doing, two key elements of neo-
liberalism are illuminated and dissected: its ideological prowess, on the one hand, and 
its manifestation as practice, on the other. In ideological terms, the article shows how 
proponents of neo-liberalism – hailing mostly from governmental and business 
quarters – have been able to secure the broad adoption of neo-liberalism as a ‘view of 
the world’ for telecommunications. Neo-liberalism in telecommunications is rarely 
questioned. In practice, and by contrast, the neo-liberal model in telecommunications 
provides evidence of a less than efficacious adoption process in three respects. First, 
‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’ has had to develop as an elaborately managed system 
necessitating a complex governance network across Europe, the regulatory burden of 
which has been under-emphasised. Second, the normative success of neo-liberalism 
has, ironically, masked how difficult it has actually proven to be to create 
competition, of even the most embryonic kind, in key sub-sectoral markets. Third, the 
preoccupation with markets and competition has resulted in de-emphasis of public 
interest issues in telecommunications, not least those related to required future levels 
of investment in this part of the information infrastructure. The article contends that 
these deficiencies tend to be under-played due to the ideological and rhetorical 
success of the neo-liberal project in telecommunications. 
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2. The Emergence of Neo-liberalism in European Telecommunications 
Organised as state run monopolies domestically, with cartel-like interface agreements 
between the national service providers for the exchange of telecommunications traffic 
internationally, the telecommunications sectors of EU states were, for much of the 
20th century, the antithesis of neo-liberalism. Bundled in with postal services, 
telecommunications were provided by a series of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone 
(PTT) administrations. The provision of telecommunications services – voice 
telephony for most users – occurred across a fixed-link infrastructure of exchanges 
and cables. In economic terms, the market was deemed to be close to uncontestable. 
The network infrastructure was expensive and time-consuming to construct. 
Considerable investment was necessary before any revenue could be generated to 
recover start up costs. There was no sound economic logic to construct competitive 
fixed networks over the same territory in such circumstances. These economics were 
further underlined by the social dimension of telecommunications. As the system 
developed, its social purpose as a communication tool became clearer and the goal of 
providing as many people as possible with the ability to access telecommunications 
was established as a policy imperative, particularly after 1945. There were also direct 
economic benefits to be accrued from a widely established and effectively functioning 
telecommunications system. This socio-economic model for telecommunications 
chimed with the established post-war political systems of western Europe, where the 
dominant, though by no means unchallenged, thinking was that the state should 
intervene strongly to provide economic and social goods: the era of the corporate state 
was in full swing. In other words, the organisation and functioning of the 
telecommunications sector was underpinned by this particular ideological ‘view of the 
world’. This outline of the telecommunications systems in Europe bears little or no 
resemblance to the current position. Since approximately the late 1970s, the corporate 
state model of telecommunications in Europe has been replaced gradually by the 
‘regulatory’ state model (Seidman and Gilmour, 1986; Moran, 2003).  
Politics aside, by the early 1970s approximately, telecommunications was a sector 
awakening from a period of relative ‘technological slumber’. The subsequent changes 
altered markedly the well-established economic characteristics of the sector and 
placed new demands on those wishing to develop it. New switching and transmission 
technologies greatly improved the functionality, but also increased research and 
development and production costs, of the telecommunications network. The 
application of computer technology to telecommunications allowed terminals to 
communicate with each other across a network. This afforded a huge potential 
expansion in the number of information services that could be provided to users: new 
value added services (VAS) now could incorporate combinations of voice, numerical 
and other data, text and video. The start up costs of becoming a provider of such 
services was nowhere near as prohibitive as for ‘traditional’ voice telephony and, in 
any event, after decades of investment, a fixed network (albeit in need of 
modernisation) was in place, to a considerable extent.  
Whilst the techno-economic nature of telecommunications was undergoing 
significant change through the 1970s and 1980s, a set of changes of a much greater 
magnitude entirely began to take hold in the international political economy. 
Emerging to prominence first in the US during the time of the Reagan administration, 
economic neo-liberalism spread initially across Europe - first having been adopted in 
the UK - and, thereafter, throughout much of the global economy. The core 
proposition of neo-liberalism is a profound faith in the efficacy of competition 
through market forces. Aside from the commercial success or otherwise accrued by 
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the protagonists in competitive markets, in essence neo-liberals argue that efficiently 
functioning markets will yield three core, inter-related broader long-term benefits: 
lower market prices; better quality of goods and services; and speedier, more dynamic 
technological progress.  
Very importantly, the neo-liberalism of the late 1970s and beyond was 
‘internationalist’ in expression: it went hand-in-hand with a much vaunted late 20th 
century globalisation of the economy, underpinning and assisting its development in 
the process. As Huffschmid (2005, p.3) argues, neo-liberalism emerged as a ‘complex 
social and political strategy responding to the increasing complexity and difficulties 
of capitalist development since the mid-1970s, expressed as a body of economic 
doctrine, placing competition and the market as the driving forces of economic and 
social development’. Here neo-liberalism-in-practice grew ‘under the ideological 
umbrella of necessary adjustments to the all encompassing process of globalisation’. 
So pervasive has been its spread that Cerny (2008, p39) has discerned a rise to 
hegemonic status where ‘the evolution of neo-liberalism over the past 30 years 
has…transformed it from a relatively dogmatic, enforced laissez-faire into a kind of 
common sense for the 21st century’. In the process, neo-liberalism has become more 
complex and differentiated in its detail and has been used by different political actors 
in different ways. Nonetheless whilst neo-liberalism’s ‘overriding set of policy goals 
has several component parts, those parts have a common normative logic…it is seen 
as necessary to design and establish institutions and practices that are market-based 
and market-led, both domestically and globally’ (Cerny 2008, p.10). This activity has 
been recognised as even going beyond commerce where ‘all social relations are 
subjected to reorganisation in a way that makes markets and competition work’ 
(Demirovic 2008, p.2). 
The intertwined agendas of neo-liberalism and globalisation held profound 
consequences for those states which would adopt them in chosen sectors of the 
economy. Domestically, where absent or only weakly evident, competition needed to 
be created among industrial players. Beyond this, in the international scenario, 
barriers to trade, on the one hand, and inward foreign direct investment of various 
kinds, on the other, needed to be very much reduced if not dismantled entirely. The 
crucial corollary was that the status and role of the corporate state in sectors in which 
it was active could no longer be maintained. 
To its advocates in the political realm in Europe, the telecommunications sector 
presented itself as a tailor made case for the introduction of neo-liberal reform, 
arguably fortuitously assisted by the aforementioned techno-economic developments 
occurring in the sector. The realisation of this ideological project in practice required 
a radical overhaul of the fundamental structure and functional characteristics of what 
was a highly peculiar sector domestically and internationally. The UK was the first of 
the EU Member States to make the decision to adopt a neo-liberal model for the 
telecommunications sector (Morgan and Webber, 1986). However, to create changes 
as radical as this required the instigation of a set of core practices, whose 
pervasiveness more widely in the neo-liberal global political economy has led them to 
be described as ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’ (Gill, 2001). First, direct state ownership 
of the telecommunications incumbent, the PTT, was reduced, though significantly in 
many European national cases, not completely relinquished. Second, the new service 
possibilities in telecommunications, based on opportunities afforded by technological 
change, were delivered through a competitively ordered market structure. Here, new 
markets for a plethora of value-added services, as well as mobile communications, 
were created. Third, competition was created in the longest established 
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telecommunications market: voice telephony. The (partly) privatised incumbent was 
licensed alongside new commercial competitors to provide services to consumers. In 
complement, as the process of neo-liberalisation of telecommunications became more 
deeply embedded, a series of sub-markets around voice telephony were established on 
some sort of competitive basis. Fourth, the act of governing the evolution of the 
telecommunications sector, formerly undertaken by the corporate state, was ceded 
through legislation to a series of newly created National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) (Thatcher, 2002). These publicly funded, operationally independent bodies 
became what has been described more widely as the ‘citadels of regulatory 
capitalism’ (Levi-Faur, Jordana and Gilardi, 2005), responsible, in our case, for 
undertaking a range of tasks associated with disciplinary neo-liberalism in 
telecommunications. 
A major feature of the re-ordering of European telecommunications along neo-
liberal lines has been the role played by the EU. Majone (2008, p.3) has argued that 
the use of neo-liberal policies by the EU has been ‘not ideological but strictly 
utilitarian’ in that such an approach is practically necessary to reduce the influence of 
the state on sectors which the EU wishes to integrate. Whilst possessing some 
explanatory merit, this cannot account for the deeply embedded nature of neo-liberal 
discourses and practices in telecommunications. As a once innately national-centric 
sector of the economy began to become internationalised in outlook, the possibility of 
developing some form of coordination in telecommunications internationally across 
the EU became live. At the EU institutional level, the European Commission proved 
keen to respond to the lobbying of interests initially made up of forerunner liberaliser 
Member States, multinational telecommunications business users and new and 
incumbent telecommunications service providers. However, the Commission was far 
from simply reactive and soon became the key European institutional normative 
‘champion’ of a neo-liberal telecommunications agenda for the EU. The EU was 
projected as a logical policy forum for the changing telecommunications sector. It 
could be used by Member States to liberalise and harmonise the parameters of 
domestic telecommunications among the EU partners in precise ways and to a 
mutually acceptable timetable. Creating a European wide market in 
telecommunications, as part of the much wider Single European Market initiative 
(European Commission, 1985), would provide the context to allow the commercial 
exploitation of a burgeoning sector within a relatively familiar European market 
space. It could also provide a suitable ‘training ground’ to exploit global 
telecommunications markets should the neo-liberal agenda be more widely adopted, 
as became increasingly the expectation. The EU would, as a consequence, deliver in 
practice the promises of neo-liberalism (lower consumer prices, better service quality 
and faster innovation). Finally, it was argued that the internationalised neo-
liberalisation of telecommunications through the EU could provide a context to 
protect, but also to deliver, those elements of the public service tradition of 
telecommunications still held to be of value in the new era. By association alone, the 
idea soon arose that neo-liberal telecommunications could deliver necessary social 
goods as well as business and consumer prosperity. 
 
3. The Emergence of a Neo-liberal Telecommunications System in the EU 
Thus, from the late 1980s onwards, EU Member States began to utilise the EU 
route to transform their telecommunications sectors. It is important to note that the 
process did not occur identically in all Member States, nor has it been free of 
controversy and disagreement. For example, the UK had already liberalised 
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comprehensively its telecommunications sector by the time the European Commission 
first produced a neo-liberal policy blueprint for telecommunications in the form of a 
green paper in 1987 (European Commission, 1987). Nevertheless, through the 1990s 
and into this decade, the system of EU telecommunications governance has become 
an important and deeply embedded part of the EU policy canon. It has developed 
within a legislative framework, mostly in the form of directives, requiring 
transposition and implementation at the national level (see Humphreys and Simpson, 
2005).  
In political-economic terms, telecommunications provides one of the most 
prominent examples of the core consequence of neo-liberalism: the replacement of the 
corporate, directly interventionist, state by the arm’s length, ‘regulatory’ state. The 
regulatory state in Europe has been recognised as a phenomenon in which the EU’s 
presence is highly significant (Majone, 1996). A key feature of the European 
regulatory state in telecommunications has been its constant evolutionary nature. A 
series of temporary points of policy equilibrium has been in evidence (see Simpson, 
2008) the period before which an often intense process of policy negotiation, based on 
a comprehensive review of the ‘state of play’ in the sector, has taken place. This 
resulted in major agreements to liberalise telecommunications services and 
infrastructures in the early 1990s (the ‘1998 Framework’); as well as significant 
modification and refinement of the regulatory framework in 2003 (resulting in the 
Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework) and 2009. 
The EU has also played a key role in the global institutionalisation of the neo-
liberal telecommunications model in the World Trade Organization. Formed in 1995 
as a result of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the WTO is the 
prime example of an organisation created specifically to advance the adoption of the 
neo-liberal free international trade agenda. However, it has also addressed a range of 
measures which are related to the facilitation of trade, notably inward investment and 
intellectual property protection. In telecommunications, a major breakthrough 
occurred with the signing in 1997 of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications 
(ABT), as a result of which 69 states agreed to open up their telecommunications 
services markets to international trade competition. Equally significant, a large 
number of these signatories also adopted what became known as the Reference Paper 
on Telecommunications. As a consequence, a set of principles assistive to the creation 
of free market competition was adopted by 57 of the ABT signatories, such as the 
setting up of independent regulatory authorities, non-discriminatory licensing, and 
interconnection. EU Member States, alongside the USA, were the prime-movers in 
pushing for the ABT and the Reference Paper (Young, 2002). From an EU 
perspective, the resulting agreements were very much in line with the decisions made 
by its Members regarding their own telecommunications liberalisation. The EU was 
successful, therefore, in securing the uploading of its policy preferences to the global 
trade level in telecommunications, and in the process it has become one of the arch 
proponents of neo-liberalism in telecommunications at the global level (Simpson and 
Wilkinson, 2002). 
 
 
4. The Efficacy of the Neo-liberal Model in Telecommunications 
The ideological spread of neo-liberalism as a normative view of the way 
telecommunications should be organised is by now for the most part unquestioned 
nationally across Europe and at the EU institutional level. It is important to note that 
neo-liberalism has, in telecommunications, often been as much about antipathy 
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towards the direct interventionist role that might be played by the state as the 
championing of competition and market forces. Levi-Faur, Jordana and Gilardi (2005, 
p.3-4) have found that the era of regulatory capitalism spawned by neo-liberalism ‘is 
much less politicized and contentious’ than previous phases of industrial capitalism 
yet the accompanying slew of new regulatory agencies have neither been part of party 
political manifestos nor, consequently, have they been ‘brought to electorates for 
discussion and reflection’. That neo-liberalism had become deeply locked-in as the 
dominant ideological perspective on telecommunications was abundantly evident 
relatively early on in the landmark 1994 Bangemann Report, Europe and the Global 
Information Society, which set out in uncompromising terms a broader neo-liberal 
blueprint for the development of information infrastructures and services (Bangemann 
Report, 1994) building on the more equivocal stance of the 1987 Green Paper on the 
creation of the Single European Market in telecommunications. Since the mid-1990s, 
a raft of liberalising and harmonising legislation has shaped the neo-liberal character 
of telecommunications in Europe. This has been accompanied by the creation of 
regulatory committees at the European level, working - and often containing 
overlapping membership – with national regulatory authorities.  
Nonetheless, despite the huge political and financial investment made in it, realising 
an efficaciously functioning neo-liberal telecommunications system across the EU has 
proven problematic in a several important respects. Competition has evidently been 
slow to develop in a number of national markets where Member States have often in 
practice proven uneasy liberalisers. Regarding the transposition of EU legislation into 
national law, early on the European Commission upbraided France for a delay in 
introducing legislation about licensing procedures. It also launched infringement 
proceedings against Spain in 1997 for failing to allow unrestricted establishment of 
new telecommunications infrastructures by competitors to the incumbent. In the late 
1990s too, Italy was a major cause for concern for the Commission over its 
transposition of agreed measures. Other Member states to have been cited for poor 
transposition of measures agreed as part of the 1998 regulatory package were 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland Luxembourg and Portugal (Humphreys and Simpson 2005, 
pp.69-71). Infringement proceedings have also been launched in respect of 
transposition of ECRF legislation against variously Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  The European Commission in its 2004 
report on the implementation of the ECRF noted that necessary legislation was still 
missing from the statute books of Spain, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. In this report, whilst noting the emergence of competition in a 
number of areas, the Commission also pointed out that incumbents’ (ex PTTs) market 
share of local call markets was high in certain cases. In 2002, in the local call market, 
the former incumbents still held on average 90% of the market (European 
Commission 2002, pp.4-5). In the fixed voice telephony market, the average 
incumbent market share was still as much as 65% at the end of 2006 (European 
Commission 2008a, p.18). In as many as 23 EU Member states, the mobile 
communications market tends towards merely an oligopoly of network operators (3-4 
competitors), at best. The two leading companies in this market on average have a 
combined share of 71.5% (derived from European Commission 2008a, pp.12-13). The 
Commission has also complained about the independence of certain NRAs, as well as 
the length of time taken to deal with regulatory appeals (European Commission 
2004). In 2008, it was still voicing concerns about the time taken by NRAs to resolve 
disputes in Belgium, Italy and Portugal.  
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The neo-liberal system of telecommunications in Europe has required an elaborate 
and burdensome set of rules which have constantly been modified in an effort to 
realise functioning competition. Often telecommunications firms, especially 
incumbents, have been able to disguise costs, due to the problem of information 
asymmetry between them and the regulatory authority. The regulatory workload from 
this has been significant despite efforts made by the EU to streamline the system 
through time. The creation of the ECRF in 2003 was accompanied by a significant 
expansion in the number of designated markets in telecommunications subject to ex 
ante regulation to as many as 18. These markets all required regular detailed reviews 
by NRAs and the European Commission. The ECRF also required NRAs to undertake 
work more speedily to settle regulatory disputes arising in their jurisdiction, creating 
extra pressure. The European Commission voiced its displeasure at the speed at which 
decisions were being made, citing the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, the UK, Finland 
and France as culprits (European Commission, 2002). This list comprises a very wide 
range of EU Member States, both initial policy leaders and relative laggards in 
telecommunications liberalisation. In its 2008 report, the Commission still 
complained of delay in the imposition by NRAs of regulatory remedies.  Worse, it 
noted cases of remedies where ‘the level of detail is not sufficient to guarantee a solid 
basis for investment and market entry’ (European Commission 2008b, p.11). In 
particular, it took Germany, Estonia, Ireland and Finland to task about delays between 
the completion of market analyses and the imposition of definitive obligations. 
Elsewhere concerns were expressed over the degree of detail of regulatory remedies 
which did not ‘create the level of certainty needed to generate real investment and to 
justify the launch of commercial competitive activity for those products’ (European 
Commission 2008b, p.45). Increased bureaucracy also was created for NRAs with the 
requirement placed upon them by the ECRF under its Framework directive to report 
any regulatory decisions made on the existence of excessive market power to the 
Commission for its scrutiny, placing additional regulatory pressure on the latter too. 
The so called article 7 procedure on such activity had by the end of 2007 resulted in 
as many as 700 ex ante measures having been notified to the Commission (Reding 
2007, p.3). 
Neo-liberalism in EU telecommunications has produced a complex and often 
controversial system of regulatory actors in the form of a two level pluri-lateral 
regulatory network composed of the European Commission, NRAs, governmental 
representatives and telecommunications companies (Humphreys and Simpson, 2008). 
From the outset, a series of technocratic EU regulatory committees were created to 
establish and implement disciplinary neo-liberalism in telecommunications. A High 
Level Regulators Group was established as early as 1992 as a policy forum for EU 
ministerial representation in telecommunications. The Open Network Provision and 
Licensing committees were created to deal with the complex and specialised matters 
arising in these areas. This series of committees served to create a regulatory network 
of people keen to solve technical problems and exchange best practice with each 
other. Outside the EU, NRAs in 1997 established the Independent Regulators Group 
as a problem solving and learning forum which has actually come to be a source of 
irritation to the Commission. The ECRF in 2003 produced an increase in the number 
of regulatory committees at EU level from 3 to 5 with the creation of the European 
Regulators Group, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group, the Communications 
Committee, the Radio Spectrum Committee and the Working Party on the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data.  
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Problems with the functioning of neo-liberal telecommunications markets aside, the 
issue of so-called Next Generation Networks has placed further question marks over 
the efficacy of the neo-liberal model. One of the most powerful aspects of neo-
liberalism’s rhetorical success has been its flexibility where a range of political and 
social actors have viewed it ‘to be a more and more suitable vehicle for framing 
problems and developing strategies for pursuing their objectives’ (Cerny 2008, p.33), 
in this case, delivering the economic and social benefits from new high speed 
communications networks. However, the European Commission has noted the 
concern of newer telecommunications service providers ‘that little or no transparency 
exists over the NGN roll-out strategy of the fixed incumbent’ (European Commission 
2008b, p.47) which according to Reding, still controls as much as 89.5% of direct 
access to customers (Reding 2007, p.2). In a market-led telecommunications sector, 
this raises a significant question mark over which organisations might provide NGN 
investments, if not the incumbents.  Despite this, the EU is likely to persist with its 
assumption that engineered competition will be the route to the creation of NGNs, the 
EU’s role being to establish a conducive regulatory environment. It has shown itself 
to be deeply opposed to the granting of regulatory holidays to incumbents – that is 
temporary absolution from having to make their networks available to competitors -  
in return for commitments from them to invest in NGNs (European Commission, 
2006).  
Nonetheless, for Member States there may be a contradiction between creating 
competition in this new aspect of telecommunications as a policy goal in itself and the 
need to ensure roll-out of the new networks and services as quickly as possible. It has 
been argued that the creation of point-to-point fibre infrastructure, allowing 
transparent competitive usage by commercial players (in return for a fairly established 
access fee being paid to its proprietor) ‘is rarely being deployed by market investors’ 
but is, on the contrary being utilised more often ‘in open access schemes initiated by 
municipalities’ (Reding 2008, p.5). This suggests that a different, non-proprietary, 
model might be developed to deliver NGNs in the future. It may well be worth re-
considering certain elements of telecommunications – in this case the core high speed 
information infrastructure – as a public good. Here, those elements of the sector 
which have proven to be contestable in market terms could be allowed to flourish. 
Others might be delivered through the public sector in the public interest, perhaps in 
conjunction with one or more regulated private entities. As Cerny (2008, p.36) notes, 
‘[c]ontemporary politics entails both a process of choosing between different versions 
of neo-liberalism, and the attempt to innovate creatively within the new neoliberal 
playing field’ which may lead to ‘ ‘“reinventing the social”’ in a neo-liberal world.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The telecommunications sector in Europe has undergone radical reorganisation over 
the last 30 years. As this article has illustrated, change has been justified and driven 
with remarkable success by proponents of neo-liberalism. In this crucial part of the 
information environment, there is no doubt that, compared with the days of the 
traditional state-owned monopolies, improvements have occurred. The cost of core 
basic telecommunications services has, for example, fallen significantly and service 
quality improved. The European Commission has calculated that in 2006 ‘consumers 
in the EU15 spent around 27% less for the same telecoms services than 10 years ago – 
in real terms this represents a 40% decrease’ (European Commission 2007, p.12). 
However, though often trumpeted rhetorically as an exemplar of the unqualified 
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triumph of the neo-liberal model, this article shows that in practice the picture in 
telecommunications is more complex. Often the dogmatic ideological antipathy of 
neo-liberalism towards the state, and the public sector more broadly, has created 
blindspots not only to its practical costs but also its limitations. It should, for example, 
be borne in mind that the period in question has witnessed major technological change 
as a result of which basic telecommunications services could be expected to become 
cheaper and of better quality. Market failure, as recently claimed by the European 
Commission, is now a feature of the telecommunications sector across the EU 
(European Commission 2007, p.24). The current European and global economic 
downturn has begun, more generally, to cast doubts over the perceived efficacy of the 
neo-liberal model. In telecommunications specifically, the issue of next generation 
broadband networks places a major question mark over the private sector’s ability to 
secure the future development of the sector. The time may well be ripe for a re-
evaluation of the role of the public sector and the public interest in 
telecommunications. Given the areas in which the neo-liberal model has 
underperformed (alongside those areas where it has been successful) it is apposite to 
‘abandon the a priori assumption of the general superiority of the market’ 
(Huffschmid et al. 2007, p.235). The current and likely future poor state of public 
sector finances across the EU, however, suggests that in telecommunications this is 
unlikely to occur to any significant extent in the foreseeable future. 
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